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Bono and Jesse Helms want debt relief for the world’s developing countries.  The Pope and 17 
million people are behind them.  At a June 1999 meeting of G8 leaders in Cologne, Germany, the 
lead singer of the rock band U2 presented Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder with 17 million signatures 
in support of the Debt Relief Initiative (Jubilee (2000)).  In November 1998, Pope John Paul II 
issued a Papal Bull calling on the wealthy nations to relieve the debts of developing nations in order 
to “remove the shadow of death” (The Vatican (1998)). 
Opponents of debt relief occupy less hallowed ground but are no less zealous about their 
cause, citing at least two reasons why the debt relief campaign is misguided.  First, debt relief alone 
cannot solve the problem of developing-country debt.  Even if all debt were forgiven, it will 
accumulate again if income does not grow faster than expenditure (O’Neill (2002)).  Second, debt 
relief can create perverse incentives for debtor countries.  By relaxing budget constraints, debt relief 
may permit governments to prolong wasteful economic policies (Easterly (2001a, 2000b) and Barro 
(1999)).   
Do the benefits of debt relief outweigh the costs?  Or is debt relief a welfare-reducing market 
intervention?  The stock market provides a natural place to search for answers.  Changes in stock 
prices reflect both revised expectations about future corporate profits and the discount rate at which 
those profits are capitalized.  Consequently, the stock market response to the announcement of a debt 
relief program collapses the entire expected future stream of debt relief costs and benefits into a 
single summary statistic: the expected net benefit (current and future) of the program. 
The expected effect of debt relief on the stock market depends on the model of sovereign 
lending to which one subscribes.  Models of private lending to sovereign countries that emphasize 
costs suggest three channels through which debt relief may adversely affect the recipient country’s 
stock market.1  First, if debt relief allows a government to persist in pursuing wasteful policies, 
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economic growth and corporate profits may be reduced, impacting stock prices adversely.  Second, 
countries that do not honor their debts may incur costs in the form of trade sanctions, which may 
also hurt growth and profits (Bulow and Rogoff (1989a)).  If debt relief negotiations involve costly 
bargaining, countries could find themselves punished by lenders.  In practice, countries that 
renegotiate their debts do experience a subsequent loss of access to trade (Rose and Spiegel (2002)).  
Third, debt relief involves the restructuring of private debt, which may damage the debtor’s 
reputation for repayment and raise its future cost of borrowing in international capital markets 
(Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)).2    
On the other hand, borrower and lenders can benefit from debt relief when the borrower 
suffers from debt overhang.  If each creditor would agree to forgive some of its claims, then the 
debtor would be better able to service the debt owed to each creditor.  Consequently, the expected 
value of all creditors’ claims would rise (Krugman (1988) and Sachs (1989)).  Forgiveness will not 
happen without coordination, however, because any individual creditor would prefer to have a free 
ride, maintaining the full value of its claims while others write off some debt. 
By forcing all creditors to accept some losses, debt relief can solve the collective action 
problem and pave the way for profitable new lending (Cline (1995)).  By relaxing the intertemporal 
budget constraint, the new capital inflow may reduce the discount rate in the debtor country.  To the 
extent that the country suffers from a debt overhang caused by the collective action problem, debt 
relief increases the incentive to undertake efficient investments.  In turn, these investments may raise 
expected future growth rates and cash flows (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1989), Krugman (1989), 
Myers (1977), and Sachs (1989)).  
On March 10, 1989, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Nicholas F. Brady, 
called for developing-country debt relief.  Between 1989 and 1995, 16 developing countries reached 
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debt relief agreements with their private creditors under the Brady Plan.  Figure 1 shows what 
happened.  In anticipation of the official announcement of its Brady deal, the average country’s 
stock market appreciated by 60% over the 12-month pre-announcement period.  Stated in dollar 
terms, the market capitalization of debtor country stock markets rose by a total of 42 billion dollars.   
[Figure 1 About Here] 
Nor were the wealth gains from debt relief simply a wealth transfer to the debtor nations 
from western commercial banks.  Figure 2 shows that the stock prices of the 11 major U.S. 
commercial banks with large LDC loan exposure increased by an average of 35%—a 13.3 billion 
dollar increase in market capitalization.  Adding the countries’ wealth increase to that of the banks 
gives a rough sense of the Brady Plan’s net benefit. 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
To be sure, the stock market demonstrates efficiency gains only in a narrow ex-post sense.  
Debt relief may also induce ex-ante contracting inefficiencies.  For example, ex-ante knowledge that 
debts may be restructured may reduce efficiency by making borrowers less careful.  On the other 
hand, knowledge that debts may be restructured could raise efficiency by making lenders more 
careful (Darity and Horn (1988), Fischer (1987), and Bolton and Skeel (2003)).3  Our data do not 
admit analysis of these ex-ante issues.  Nevertheless, to the extent that debt restructurings induce ex-
ante efficiency losses, the existence of some ex-post efficiency gains is a necessary condition for 
debt relief to be welfare improving. 
In addition to the narrowness of our welfare metric, there are many other reasons to be 
concerned about using the stock market to evaluate debt relief.  For example, one should not look at 
debtor-country stock market responses in isolation.  If the Brady Plan coincides with a positive 
global economic shock that is unrelated to debt relief, then debtor-country stock markets will rise in 
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concert with stock markets in countries that do not sign debt relief agreements. 
In order to distinguish the effect of debt relief from that of a common shock, compare the 
stock market response of the Brady countries with the market response of a similar group of 
countries that did not sign Brady deals.  Figure 1 shows that a control group of non-signing 
developing countries does not experience a significant increase in stock prices.  Similarly, Figure 2 
shows that the price increase for U.S. commercial banks is not driven by a common shock; there is 
no significant price increase for a control group of U.S. commercial banks that did not have 
significant developing-country exposure. 
Perhaps a greater concern is that anticipated economic reforms drive the price increase 
shown in Figure 1.  Countries receive Brady deals in return for committing to IMF- and World-
Bank-supported reforms that are designed to increase openness and raise productivity.  So, it is 
possible that stock prices go up because debt relief signals future reforms.  The paper attempts to 
distinguish the effects of debt relief from those of reforms by making use of a key historical fact.  On 
October 8, 1985, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, James A. Baker III, announced a 
plan for dealing with the Developing Country Debt Crisis.  The Baker Plan called on the debtor 
countries to undertake extensive economic reforms—stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization, 
and greater openness to foreign direct investment—but deliberately excluded any plans for debt 
relief.  In contrast, the Brady Plan explicitly called for debt relief in addition to the continuation of 
the reforms begun under the Baker Plan four years earlier. 
The difference between the focus of the two plans implies that the “news” in the Baker 
announcement was the official U.S. push for economic reforms, while the “news” in the Brady 
announcement was the official U.S. push for debt relief.  In other words, because economic reforms 
were enacted under the Baker Plan, their effects should already have been incorporated into stock 
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prices when the Brady Plan was announced.  If markets are efficient, then the market reaction to the 
Brady Plan should principally reflect the anticipated effect of debt relief. 
The Baker Plan notwithstanding, it is still important to confirm that what Figure 1 shows is 
not driven by the economic reforms enacted around the time of the Brady Plan.  We do just that, and 
address other concerns about the robustness of our results as well.  In addition to inferring that the 
Brady agreement did not signal any new information about economic reforms, we also confront the 
issue directly.  We do so by documenting the dates on which major reforms occurred and testing 
empirically whether the reforms had any effect on stock prices.  While our tests are not definitive, 
the stock market increase associated with debt relief remains economically large and statistically 
significant in all regression specifications that include the economic reform variables. 
After grappling with concerns about robustness, we turn to more primitive issues of 
interpretation: Why do stock prices rise?  Is this a spurious result?  Or does the stock market 
rationally forecast future changes in the fundamentals?  If market values rise because debt relief 
paves the way for profitable new lending, then the stock market responses should have some 
predictive power for future changes in net resource transfers (NRTs).  Similarly, if the Brady Plan 
alleviated debt overhang, we should see more investment and growth.  The descriptive evidence we 
provide is not definitive, but the stock market responses do help to predict changes in the NRT, 
investment, and GDP growth for up to five years following the agreements. 
I.  The Debt Crisis and The Brady Plan 
The Mexican default on August 12, 1982, triggered the beginning of the Developing Country 
Debt Crisis.  The next five years were marked by frequent debt restructurings and new-money 
packages that tried but failed to resolve the crisis (James (1996), Chapter 12).  A critical point was 
reached in February 1987, when Brazil declared a debt moratorium and suspended all interest 
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payments to its creditors.  In response to the Brazilian moratorium, Citibank announced a $2.5 
billion increase in its loan-loss reserves on May 20.  Shortly after Citibank’s decision, a number of 
other banks made similar announcements (Boehmer and Megginson (1990)). 
Table I provides a brief summary of the debt restructuring history of the 16 developing 
countries that eventually received a Brady Plan.  Column 2 shows that a large number of 
restructurings took place in each country between 1982 and the time of its Brady deal.  Column 3 
indicates that a number of countries began to restructure their debt prior to Citicorp’s increase in 
loan-loss reserves, suggesting that developing country loans may, in fact, have become non-
performing prior to May 1987.  Column 4 gives the date of the last debt restructuring that took place 
before the announcement of a country’s Brady deal; only 4 countries did not restructure their debt 
after May 1987. 
[Table I About Here] 
Finally, column 5 of Table I lists the official announcement date of each country’s Brady 
Plan.  The principal source of announcement dates is International Debt Reexamined (Cline (1995), 
Table 5.3, p. 234).  However, the book does not provide announcement dates for Bolivia, Nigeria, 
Panama, Peru and the Philippines.  For these 5 countries we retrieved announcement dates using the 
LexisNexis Academic Universe (http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe).  We verified the accuracy of 
the search by matching the dates obtained from Lexis-Nexis with those in the Quarterly Economic 
Reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).   
A. What Was Restructured? 
The goal of the Brady Plan was to restructure the commercial banks’ loans in such a way that 
interest payments would be reduced, principal forgiven, and maturities lengthened.  The plan 
restructured both the public and publicly guaranteed debt claims of the commercial banks.  The 
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public debt consisted of commercial banks’ loans to the central government.  The publicly 
guaranteed debt consisted of loans that were guaranteed by the central government: trade credit; 
project finance; and bank loans to regional governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  
Roughly 50% of the debt was held by U.S. commercial banks (Cline (1995), pp. 62, 76).  Under the 
Brady Plan, the commercial banks were presented with four restructuring options: 
 
(1) Discount Bonds: Issue bonds with the total face value of the debt reduced by 30 to 
35% and an interest rate of LIBOR plus 13/16; a “bullet” single payment maturity of 
30 years with U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond collateral on principal and a rolling 
guarantee of 12 to 18 months of interest. 
 
(2) Par Bonds: Issue bonds worth the full face value of the debt with an interest rate 
of 6% and similar maturity and collateralization as the discount bonds. 
 
(3) New Money: Retain the full value of the debt, but issue new loans in the amount 
of 25% of current exposure over the next three years, with at least half of the new 
money coming within the first year. 
 
(4) Cash Buybacks: Repurchase the debt at a specific price. 
 
In countries that were relatively less indebted, banks favored the new money option, whereas 
in heavily indebted countries there was very little new money.  Cash buybacks were limited to small, 
low-income countries with little bank debt, such as Costa Rica.  The discount bond was designed for 
banks concerned about limiting the risk of interest rate fluctuations.  The par bond was intended for 
banks located in countries where regulatory and tax considerations made maintaining full face value 
preferable (Cline (1995)).   
In total, approximately 202.8 billion dollars worth of debt was restructured, resulting in 64.7 
billion dollars of debt relief.  The average spread on the loans fell from 17/16 over LIBOR before the 
Brady Plan to 13/16 over LIBOR on the discount bonds after the restructuring.4  Similarly, debt 
prices rose.  In the year prior to restructuring, the average country’s debt was trading at 32 cents on 
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the dollar in the secondary market.  In the month of the Brady Deal, the average price rose to 42 
cents on the dollar.  Finally, the average maturity of the debt increased from 15 to 30 years.   
 
II.  Data and Descriptive Findings 
The principal source of stock market data is the IFC’s Emerging Markets Data Base 
(EMDB).5  Stock price indices for individual countries are the dividend-inclusive, U.S. dollar-
denominated and local currency-denominated IFC Global Indices.  For most countries, EMDB’s 
coverage begins in December 1975, but for others coverage begins in December 1984.  Each 
country’s U.S. dollar-denominated stock price index is deflated by the U.S. consumer price index 
(CPI), which comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS).  The local currency-
denominated index is deflated by the local consumer price index for each country, which is also 
obtained from the IFS.  Returns and inflation are calculated as the first difference of the natural 
logarithm of the real stock price and CPI, respectively.  All of the data are monthly.  We were able to 
obtain stock market data for 10 of the Brady countries: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Jordan, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and Venezuela.   
 
A.  Selection of the Control Group 
The control group consists of all developing countries that (1) did not receive a Brady plan 
and (2) have stock market data in the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Emerging Market 
Data Base.  There are 16 such countries: Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, 
and Zimbabwe.   
The purpose of the control group is to determine whether the stock price increase in the 
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debtor countries was driven by a global economic shock unrelated to debt relief.  Therefore, it is 
crucial that the control group not consist of countries in such an abject state of development that 
their stock markets would not respond to a positive external shock, no matter how favorable.  We 
address this concern by examining the characteristics of the Brady and control groups in some detail. 
The Brady countries and the control group display similar geographical dispersion.  Both 
groups contain countries from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe.  One significant 
difference is that Latin American countries comprise the largest fraction of the Brady countries, 
while the control group primarily consists of countries in Asia.  History suggests that the relatively 
heavier weighting of Asian countries in the control group will make that group the stronger 
economic performer.  We confirm this suspicion by comparing the Brady countries and the control 
group using two standard measures of economic performance, growth and inflation.   
The control group outperforms the Brady countries on both measures.  Between 1980 and 
1999 the median growth rate of per capita GDP for the control group was 3%.  The Brady group 
grew by only 1% per year during the same time period.  GDP growth was also less volatile in the 
control group.  The standard error of GDP growth for the control group was 1%, as compared to 2% 
for the Brady group.  Finally, the control group has a lower and less volatile rate of inflation: a 
median of 11% and a standard deviation of 3%.  The corresponding numbers for the Brady countries 
are 27 and 18.   
To summarize, the median country in the control group has faster and less volatile growth, 
together with lower and less volatile inflation, than its Brady group counterpart.  To the extent that 
superior long-run economic performance is positively correlated with better-managed economies, we 
would expect stock markets in the median control-group country to be more responsive to any 
auspicious common shock.   
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 B.  Descriptive Findings  
For each Brady country, we calculate the average monthly stock return over the entire 
sample.  The average monthly return is a proxy for the expected monthly return.  Subtracting a 
country’s expected return from its actual return gives the abnormal return.6  Let month [0] be the 
month in which a Brady debt relief announcement takes place for a given country.  Similarly, let [-
12] denote the 12th month before the debt relief announcement, so that [-12, 0] denotes the one-year 
window preceding the announcement.  The cumulative abnormal return for a country is defined as 
the sum of its abnormal returns from month –12 to month 0.   
Figure 1 plots the average cumulative abnormal return across all 10 Brady countries and the 
control group in event time.7  The solid line shows that the average Brady country experiences 
cumulative abnormal returns of 60% in real dollar terms.  In other words, the real dollar value of the 
stock market increases by 60% more than it does in a typical year.  Now look at the graph for the 
control group.  If a common shock caused stock prices to go up in the Brady countries, then we 
should also see an increase in the stock prices of the control group.  This is not the case.  The dashed 
line shows that the average cumulative abnormal return for the control group is close to 0.  The 
preliminary conclusion is that the stock price increase in the debtor countries is not due exclusively 
to a common shock that has favorable effects on all emerging stock markets.   
By constructing a control group of relatively strong economic performers, we are able to 
distinguish the effect of the Brady Plan from that of a common shock.  But Figure 1 raises an 
important question about selection bias that has not yet been addressed.  Do stock prices rise because 
countries that sign Brady Deals are the ones most likely to benefit from debt relief?  Put another 
way, would stock prices have gone up in the Brady countries had they not received debt relief?  In 
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order to address the counterfactual, we replicated the dashed line in Figure 1 using two alternative 
control groups: (1) a group of highly indebted countries that did not receive debt relief and (2) the 
Brady countries that were still waiting to receive their Brady deals.  The control-group graphs 
constructed in this manner are as flat as the graph for the original control group.8
Since there are only 10 countries in the Brady stock market group, another concern is that 
one country may dominate the results.  To explore this possibility, we conduct median tests in the 
following way.  For each of the 10 countries we compute the median annual stock return.  The stock 
return in the 12-month period preceding the Brady announcement exceeds the median, annual return 
for every country except Peru.  We also conducted median tests in local currency, and the results 
were the same.  Peru is the only country whose stock return during the 12-month announcement 
window was less than its median 12-month return. 
Finally, the results may be sensitive to whether real returns are measured in dollars or in the 
local currency.  To address the issue, we replicated Figure 1 using real local currency returns instead 
of real dollar returns.  The resulting graph was virtually identical to Figure 1.  Since the choice of 
currency makes little difference, the formal empirical analysis in Section IV focuses on the dollar-
denominated returns.   
 
C.  Why Use A 12-Month Event Window? 
Using a 12-month window provides a reasonable characterization of the data, because the 
announcement of a debt relief agreement is less a discrete occurrence than a series of events during 
which the public gradually learns the details of the government’s negotiations to reduce its external 
debt burden.  Examples from three representative countries illustrate the point.  
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Argentina had a 9-month window of negotiations with its external creditors, extending from 
July of 1991 to the official announcement of an agreement in April 1992.  In July 1991, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit reported, “The International Monetary Fund approves a 1 billion dollar 
stand-by loan.”  On September 20 1991, the Financial Times reported “Domingo Cavallo, comes to 
Washington to jump-start negotiations on the country's $61bn debt.” On March 31, 1992 the 
Financial Times reported, “Argentina secures a $3.15bn extended facility fund loan from the IMF.  
Approval of the loan is important for securing a restructuring with the creditor banks.”  
Nigeria had a 10-month window of negotiations with its external creditors, extending from 
May 1990 to its official announcement in March 1991.  The window of public negotiations began 
with a Financial Times story on October 3, 1990,  “The resolution of the five-month deadlock over 
rescheduling terms for Nigeria's $5.5bn commercial bank debt appears likely.”  The reference to a 5-
month deadlock suggests that the sequence of public events may actually have begun as early as 
May 1990.  Between October 1990 and March 1991, the Financial Times ran at least two more 
stories about Nigeria’s negotiations with its creditors. 
Finally, Venezuela had an 11-month window of negotiations that began with the Washington 
Post’s declaration on July 25, 1989: “The Mexican deal will set a pattern for dealing with the debt 
problems of other nations.  Brady puts the Philippines, Venezuela and Costa Rica at the head of the 
list.”  On March 21, 1990, the New York Times reported, “Venezuela and its creditor banks reach an 
agreement on the basic terms of a deal.” 
The average length of the window in these three countries is 10 months.  This estimate is 
based on the earliest reported news headlines that we could find through LexisNexis.  Even if these 
are, in fact, the earliest public releases of information, the possibility remains that the news was 
leaked to the markets prior to the news dates that we collected.  Admittedly, constructing the event 
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window is at least as much art as it is science, but all things considered, a 12-month window does no 
obvious harm to the data.  Furthermore, Section IV estimates results using 12-month, 9-month, 6-
month and 3-month windows—the effect of debt relief on the stock market is positive and 
significant in all specifications. 
Of course, a long event window raises the specter of reverse causality.  Instead of debt relief 
generating a stock market boom, maybe rising stock markets and improved economic prospects 
cause countries to write-down their debts.  In thinking about this issue, it is important to remember 
that countries cannot simply decide that they want debt relief and make it so.  Debt relief requires a 
mutual agreement between parties: The debtor requests a writedown and the creditor agrees to 
forgive some of the debt.  Reaching such agreements can take a long time, because both the debtor 
and creditor want to exercise their bargaining power (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1989)).  
Consequently, negotiations might reach a deadlock, which could take many months to resolve, as 
illustrated by the case of Nigeria in October 1990.  Given the length of time and the number of 
parties involved in sovereign debt restructurings, it is difficult to believe that a debtor country would 
be able to push through a debt relief agreement as a swift policy response to a rising stock market 
and improving economic prospects. 
Four central facts emerge from this section: (1) Stock markets in debtor countries rise by 
60% in real dollar terms in response to news of debt relief; (2) the response is uniformly positive 
across debtor countries; (3) the effect is not an artifact of the currency in which the revaluation is 
measured and (4) the control group never experiences a revaluation of greater than 10 percentage 
points.  Having eliminated outliers, currency concerns, and common shocks as explanations for our 
result, there is another, much trickier issue to address before proceeding to formal statistical 
estimation. 
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 III.  Are the Revaluations Driven by Debt Relief or Reforms? 
Countries receive debt relief in return for committing to economic reforms (Cline (1995)).  
These reforms take four principal forms—inflation stabilization, privatization, trade liberalization, 
and capital account liberalization—and there is evidence that the stock market responds favorably to 
each one of them (Megginson and Netter (2001), Perotti and Van Oijen (2001), and Henry (2000a, 
2002, 2003)).  Therefore, a central issue is whether debt relief or economic reforms drive the debtor-
country stock price increases.  To address the issue, we conducted a search to pinpoint the dates 
when the reforms occur.  The results are outlined in Table II. 
[Table II About Here] 
The stabilization dates come from the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Reports and 
Henry (2002).  We use the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Quarterly Economic Reports to identify 
trade liberalization dates.  We check the EIU dates against the trade liberalization dates in the World 
Bank publication, Trends in Developing Economies (1994) and those in Sachs and Warner (1995).  
The privatization dates come from the World Bank Privatization Transaction Database, which 
contains the names and dollar amounts of all privatizations occurring between 1988 and 1999.  We 
use the privatization database to identify the first year in which there were recorded sales of state-
owned enterprises.  Once we know the year of the first sale, we search the EIU’s Quarterly 
Economic Reports for the month in which the start of the privatization program was announced.  We 
also check the EIU to make sure that there were no privatizations preceding the starting date of the 
database.  Finally, the capital account liberalization dates come from Henry (2003).   
A close examination of Table II illustrates the point of the exercise.  All of the debtor 
countries began implementing major economic reforms before the Brady deal and continued to do so 
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after the deal was announced.  For example, column 3 of Table II shows that an official agreement 
with the IMF immediately precedes or follows on the heels of every Brady deal.  Since IMF 
programs follow all of the Brady agreements, Brady agreements may drive up stock prices because 
they signal future IMF agreements.  Just as debt relief agreements may signal future IMF 
agreements, IMF agreements may in turn signal countries’ commitment to future economic reforms 
(Bruno and Easterly (1996) and Collins (1990)).  If debt relief agreements are a signal of future 
productivity-enhancing reforms, then Figure 1 may erroneously suggest that debt relief drives up 
valuations when, in fact, the anticipation of future economic reforms is instead responsible.   
 
A.  The Baker Plan versus the Brady Plan 
We use the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan to help distinguish the response of the stock 
market to reforms from the response of the stock market to debt relief.  Our identification strategy 
hangs on a key historical fact.  The Baker Plan called on countries to undertake extensive reforms 
but deliberately excluded any plans for debt relief.9  In contrast, the Brady Plan called for the 
continuation of reforms begun under the Baker Plan but also made an explicit call for debt relief.  
The difference in the focus of the two plans implies that the “news” in Baker was the official 
U.S. push for economic reforms while the “news” in Brady was the official U.S. push for debt relief.  
In other words, because economic reforms were enacted under the Baker Plan, their effects should 
already have been incorporated into stock prices when the Brady Plan was announced four years 
later.  If markets are efficient, then the stock price reaction to the Brady Plan should principally 
reflect the anticipated effect of debt relief.   
On October 8, 1985, the Secretary of the United States Treasury, James A. Baker III, 
unveiled his plan for dealing with the third-world debt crisis at the Annual International Monetary 
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Fund World Bank Meeting in Seoul, Korea.  Secretary Baker begins by stressing the importance of 
macroeconomic stabilization: 
If the debt problem is going to be solved there must be a “Program for 
Sustained Growth”, incorporating . . . First and foremost, the adoption by 
principal debtor countries of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural 
policies, supported by the international financial institutions, to promote 
growth and balance of payments adjustment, and to reduce inflation (Baker 
(1985a), p. 308). 
 
After spelling out the need for stabilization, Baker calls for structural reforms: 
For those countries which have implemented reforms to address the imbalances 
in their economies, a more comprehensive set of policies can now be put in 
place . . .We believe that such institutional and structural policies should 
include: increased reliance on the private sector, and less reliance on 
government; . . .tax reform, labor market reform and development of financial 
markets; . . .market opening measures to encourage foreign direct investment 
and capital inflows, as well as to liberalize trade (Baker (1985a), p. 310). 
 
The enumeration of desired reforms in Secretary Baker’s speech displays an attention to detail that 
underscores the importance of what he does not mention: debt relief.  Baker uses or alludes to the 
word “reform” more than 25 times during the course of his speech.  But the phrases “debt relief” and 
“debt reduction” do not appear. 
While testifying before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs two 
weeks later, Secretary Baker erased any doubt that the absence of the phrase “debt relief” from his 
speech was an error of omission.  Witness the exchange between Secretary Baker and Representative 
Bill McCollum of Florida. 
 
McCollum:  “Do you anticipate that there might have to be some forgiveness 
or moratorium on interest payments to some of these countries in the process 
by the commercial lending institutions in this country?” 
 
Baker:  “No, sir; I don’t contemplate that and I think that would be the 
wrong road for us to start down . . . I don’t think there should be any 
moratorium; I don’t think there should be any capitalization of interest 
proposals or anything like that . . .” (Baker (1985b), p. 26). 
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 Roughly four years later, on March 10, 1989, Baker’s successor, Nicholas F. Brady, revealed 
his plan for dealing with the debt crisis to the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods 
Committee Conference on Third World Debt.  In no uncertain terms, Secretary Brady stated that the 
U.S. government was going to continue pushing the reforms that began under the Baker Plan: 
In 1985 we paused and took stock of our progress in addressing the problem.  
As a result of that review, together we brought forth a new strategy, centered on 
economic growth.  This still makes sense . . .The experience of the past four 
years demonstrates that the fundamental principles of the current strategy 
remain sound: Growth is essential to the resolution of debt problems.  Debtor 
nations will not achieve sufficient levels of growth without reform (Brady 
(1989), p. 116). 
 
But in addition to the reforms, Secretary Brady explicitly called for debt relief.  In sharp contrast to 
the words of his predecessor in Seoul four years earlier, Brady explicitly used the phrase “debt 
reduction” or “debt service reduction” eighteen times in his speech.  For example: 
Let me reiterate that we believe that the fundamental principles of the current 
[Baker] strategy remain valid.  However, we believe that the time has come for 
all members of the international community to consider . . . debt and debt 
service reduction on a voluntary basis . . . The path toward greater 
creditworthiness and a return to the markets for many debtor countries needs to 
involve debt reduction (Brady (1989), pp. 117-118). 
 
In a rare moment of consensus, U.S. politicians, the international banking 
fraternity, officials in debtor countries, and academics all agreed that the Brady Plan 
represented a continuation of the Baker Plan’s commitment to reforms, with the important 
change that debt relief now had the official support of the United States Treasury.10   
The historical record leaves little ambiguity about the fundamental similarity (reforms) and 
the key difference (debt relief) between the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan.  Nevertheless, there are 
several potential concerns with our identification strategy.  We will and attempt to address these 
concerns in Section V, but first we turn to the formal empirical results. 
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 IV.  Formal Empirical Results 
We evaluate the statistical significance of the relationships apparent in Figure 1 by estimating 
the following regression:  
1 2it i it it itR BRADY CONTROLα γ γ= + + +ε ,                                  (1) 
where itR  is the real return in dollars on country i ’s stock market index in month t, itBRADY  is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in [-12, 0].  CONTROL is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
in all of the control countries in Brady-Announcement months [-12, 0].  We also estimate BRADY 
and CONTROL using 9-month [-9, 0], 6-month [-6, 0], and 3-month [-3, 0] windows.  The country-
specific intercepts allow for the possibility that average expected returns may differ across countries 
due to imperfect capital market integration.   
Equation (1) constrains the coefficients on BRADY to be the same across all months, which 
means that the parameter 1γ  measures the average monthly stock market response to all Brady Plan 
Announcements.  Since the dummy variable for the event window is 12 months long, the total stock 
market response to debt relief for the Brady countries is given by 12 times the parameter estimate.   
A different estimation technique would be to use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  
This approach would have the advantage of providing a unique coefficient estimate for each country 
for each event.  However, there are also disadvantages to this approach.  The low power of 
hypothesis tests in unconstrained systems severely weakens the ability of the event study 
methodology to detect the impact of the event.  Second, SUR requires a balanced panel.  Due to the 
limited time series availability of stock market data, creating a balanced panel would result in 
discarding some of the 10 debt relief events.  Given data limitations, the pooled cross-section time 
series framework seems appropriate.  
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With an unbalanced panel, it is not possible to relax the assumption of no contemporaneous 
correlation of the error term across countries.  Therefore, we will take indirect precautions.  
Specifically, three of the alternative regression specifications to equation (1) estimate abnormal 
returns relative to the world stock market index, U.S. stock market index, and finally IFC’s emerging 
stock market index.  Since all of the sample countries are emerging markets, the inclusion of a 
composite emerging market index as a right-hand-side variable will partially control for 
contemporaneously correlated disturbance terms.  Including the emerging market index does not 
change the results. 
 
A. Basic Results 
The first row of Table III (Panel A)—labeled Country-Specific Mean—gives the results from 
the baseline specification in equation (1).  White standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Column 1a shows that the coefficient on BRADY for the 12-month window [-12, 0] is 0.05 and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Multiplying the coefficient by 12 gives the total effect, a 
60% increase in the real dollar value of the stock market.  Column 1b gives the coefficient estimate 
for the CONTROL dummy.  In contrast to the estimate for the BRADY countries, the revaluation 
effect associated with the control group is economically weak, 0.005, and is statistically 
insignificant.  Column 1c provides the p-value from a two-sided F-test of the hypothesis that the 
coefficient estimate on BRADY is equal to the coefficient estimate on CONTROL.  The p-value for 
this test is 0.001.  The difference between the BRADY estimate and the CONTROL estimate is 
statistically significant.  In other words, the stock market in BRADY countries rises by roughly 60 
percentage points more than it does in the CONTROL group.   
[Table III About Here] 
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The results using 9-month, 6-month, and 3-month windows are all consistent with the 12-
month estimates.  The coefficient estimate of BRADY ranges from 0.048 to 0.052 and is statistically 
significant in every specification.  Furthermore, the BRADY estimate is always significantly larger 
than the estimate of CONTROL (except for the 3-month window).  Row 2 of Table III (Panel A)—
labeled Constant Mean—presents estimates of equation (1) using a constant intercept term, α , 
instead of country-specific intercept terms.  The results are almost identical to those in Row 1. 
 
B. Controlling for World Stock Markets 
Equation (1) provides a parsimonious baseline specification of abnormal returns, but it does 
not allow for the influence of world stock markets on local returns.  In order to do so, we follow 
Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) and use the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) to 
measure the expected return on each country’s stock market index.  Specifically, we now estimate: 
1 2
W
it i t it itR R BRADY CONTROLα β γ γ= + + + +ε ,                        (2) 
where WtR  is the real return in dollars on the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) in month 
t.  While barriers to the international movement of capital may raise questions about the economic 
assumption of an ICAPM, as a purely statistical matter, returns on world stock market indexes do 
have some predictive power for stock returns in the countries under consideration (Henry (2000a)).11   
Row 3 of Table III (Panel A) presents estimates of BRADY and CONTROL using equation 
(2).  Row 4 presents estimates that use real U.S. stock returns, UStR , in place of 
W
tR .  Row 5 presents 
estimates that use the real dollar return on the IFC Emerging Market index, LDCtR , in place of 
W
tR .  
Row 6 presents estimates that use all three sets of world stock returns simultaneously. The results in 
Rows 3 through 6 perfectly mirror those under the benchmark specification in Rows 1 and 2.  The 
coefficient on BRADY is statistically significant under all four ICAPM specifications.  The point 
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estimate ranges from 4.9 to 3.9% per month, and the estimate of BRADY is significantly larger than 
the estimate of CONTROL in all but the 3-month window estimates. 
 
C.  Other Robustness Checks 
The estimates in Panel A of Table III adjust for cross-country heteroskedasticity and cross-
country correlation, but they do not account for potential serial correlation in the error terms.  Hence, 
White standard errors may not be sufficient to ensure the reliability of the estimates in Panel A.  To 
address this concern, Panel B of Table III re-estimates all of the specifications in Panel A using 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS).  FGLS allows for the possibility of serial correlation, in 
addition to correcting for cross-country heteroskedasticity.   
The estimations using FGLS in Panel B yield the same conclusions as the OLS estimates in 
Panel A.  Every FGLS point estimate of BRADY in Panel B of Table III is statistically significant.  
The FGLS monthly point estimates of BRADY are smaller than those obtained using OLS, but they 
are still large.   The smallest point estimate for the 12-month window is 0.034— a total revaluation 
of greater than 40 percent.  Furthermore, the coefficient on BRADY remains significantly larger than 
the coefficient on CONTROL in all of the specifications except for some of those that use 3-month 
windows. 
 
V.  Alternative Explanations 
Section IV establishes the statistical robustness of the central result:  In anticipation of the 
announcement of debt relief agreements, there is an economically large and statistically significant 
increase in the stock market.  There are, however, many possible interpretations of this fact.  Section 
III argues that since markets are forward looking, stock prices in the debtor countries should have 
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priced in the effect of economic reforms at the time of the Baker Plan.  If the only “news” in the 
Brady Plan was the information about debt relief, then debt relief may plausibly be viewed as the 
proximate cause of the revaluation.   
Plausibility, however, hangs on the validity of three key assumptions: (1) The market 
believed that the Baker Plan would lead to reforms; (2) the depth and scope of reforms under Brady 
were the same as those under Baker; and (3) the reforms went through as expected.  Figure 3 leaves 
little doubt that market participants in debtor countries viewed the Baker Plan as a signal of future 
economic reforms—stock market values increased by an average of 22% in real dollar terms over 
the 12-month period preceding the Baker Plan.12  So, the two key questions are: Were the depth and 
scope of the reforms the same under Baker and Brady?  And did the reforms go through as 
anticipated?  We now address each of these questions in turn.   
[Figure 3 About Here] 
A. Do Differences in Depth and Scope of Reforms Drive the Results? 
If the Brady Plan called for structural changes that were not a part of the Baker Plan, then the 
Brady Plan could contain important new information about reforms.  Therefore, the estimates in 
Section IV may be interpreted as the marginal effect of debt relief only if the reforms implemented 
under Baker were not be radically different from those that continued under Brady.   
A careful reading of both Baker and Brady’s speeches reveals no significant differences 
between the reforms advocated under each plan.13  In fact, the reforms were so similar that they 
came to be summarized as the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson (1990)).14  An exhaustive 
summary of the Washington Consensus is beyond the scope of this paper, but again, the central idea 
was that countries should stabilize inflation, privatize state-owned enterprises, liberalize trade, and 
permit greater foreign direct investment.   
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 B.  Did the Reforms Go Through as Anticipated? 
 There may have been a consensus about the desired set of reforms, but the very need for a 
Brady Plan in addition to the Baker Plan suggests that at least some of the expected reforms did not 
go through as planned.15  If the countries did not actually undertake the reforms they agreed to 
implement under the Baker Plan, then signing a Brady agreement could signal to the markets a new 
commitment to reform.  Accordingly, the stock price increase in that case would reflect the expected 
effects of both reforms and debt relief.  
If the Brady Plan contained new information about reforms, then a more accurate measure of 
the effect of debt relief might be the difference between the stock market reaction to the Brady Plan 
and the reaction to the Baker Plan.  The reaction to the Brady Plan measures the effect only of debt 
relief and reforms; the stock market reaction to the Baker Plan measures the effect of reforms.  Thus, 
in principle, the difference between the Baker revaluation depicted in Figure 3 (22 percentage 
points) and the Brady revaluation (60 percentage points) yields the marginal effect of debt relief.  
But viewing the difference in the market’s response to Baker and Brady as the marginal 
effect of debt relief is also not without problems.  The expected effect of reform on the stock market 
is given by the benefit of reform conditional on success multiplied by the probability of success.  
Even assuming that the conditional benefit of a successful reform was the same under Baker and 
Brady, there may have been differing probabilities of success.  For example, some observers argue 
that debt relief gave governments the capital they needed to push through further reforms with a 
populace that had grown weary with austerity measures and structural adjustment.16  If this is the 
case, then the difference between the stock market response to Baker and Brady reflects both the 
effect of debt relief and the higher probability of successful reforms under Brady. 
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 C.  Direct Controls for the Effect of Economic Reforms 
We deal directly with the concern that economic reforms implemented around the time of the 
Brady Plan may still have contained some “news” by including dummy variables for reforms in all 
of our earlier regressions.  There is sufficient heterogeneity in the timing of the economic reforms 
(Table II) to allow us to control directly for their effect on stock prices.  To do so, we construct a 
series of reform dummies for each country: TRADE, PRIVATIZE, and LIBERALIZE.  These 
variables take on the value 1 during the month a reform is announced and in each of the preceding 
11 months.  We then estimate the following regression: 
1 2 3 4 5
W
it i t it it it it it itR R BRADY CONTROL TRADE PRIVATE LIBERALIZEα β γ γ γ γ γ= + + + + + + +ε (3)
. 
Table IV presents the results.  The coefficient on BRADY is significant at the 1% or 5% level 
for every window, and is significantly different from the coefficient on CONTROL in every 
specification.  The results are also consistent with the view that stock prices incorporated the effect 
of economic reforms long before the Brady Plan was announced. 
[Table IV About Here] 
Stock market liberalizations are the only economic reform implemented around the time of 
the Brady Plan that have any effect on the markets.  It is no coincidence that stock market 
liberalizations are also the only reform in our regression that was not a part of the Washington 
Consensus.  The Baker Plan called for the liberalization of foreign direct investment; Liberalization 
of portfolio equity investment is not directly mentioned.  In other words, stock market liberalizations 
were a surprise.  Consistent with the findings of a number of papers, the stock market liberalization 
dummy is significant for the [-6, 0] and [-3, -1] windows (Henry (2000a, 2000b, and 2003)).   
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Because every debt relief agreement closely coincides with an IMF agreement, we cannot 
disentangle the debt relief effect by inserting into equation (3) a dummy variable for IMF programs 
that coincide with debt relief announcements.  An IMF dummy constructed in that way would be 
collinear with the BRADY dummy and present the attendant econometric problems.  Therefore, we 
adopt a different tack.  We examine whether the stock market responds to IMF agreements that are 
not accompanied by debt relief.   
We do so by constructing for each country a list of all IMF programs that did not occur 
within a year (before or after) of the announcement of its Brady agreement.  We then create a 
dummy variable, IMFPROGRAM, which takes on the value one for all such programs, and estimate 
the following regression:  
1
W
it t it itR R IMFPROGRAMα β γ= + + +ε .                                    (4) 
Following the earlier specifications, we estimate 12-month, 9-month, 6-month, and 3-month 
windows.  If the stock market responds positively to IMF agreements that are not accompanied by 
debt relief, then the estimate of 1γ  should be positive and significant.   
There is no evidence that the stock market responds positively to IMF agreements that are 
not associated with a Brady debt relief agreement.  The coefficient estimate of IMFPROGRAM is 
negative and statistically insignificant in every specification.  The estimate for the 12-month window 
is –0.016; the estimate for the 9-month window is -0.011; the estimate for the 6-month window is -
0.004; and the estimate for the 3-month window is -0.027.17
 
VI.  Why Do Market Values Rise? 
Do the debtor country stock price increases reflect an irrational exuberance about the efficacy 
of debt relief?  Or do they rationally forecast important subsequent changes in the countries’ 
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economic fundamentals?  Theory points to three pieces of data that can help answer the question: the 
net resource transfer (NRT), investment, and growth. 
The NRT is the net flow of real resources into a country.  In theory, developing countries 
should experience positive NRTs, as the rate of return in these countries should be higher than in 
rich countries.  However, the NRT may suddenly turn negative if adverse shocks or poor economic 
management  drive creditors to call in existing loans and  make potential new creditors unwilling to 
lend.   
Because the government pays its external debt by taxing domestic firms and households, the 
private sector’s expected future tax burden increases sharply when the country’s NRT suddenly turns 
negative.  The higher future tax burden discourages investment and results in creditors being able to 
recover less than they would if some of the debt was forgiven.  By reducing the implicit marginal tax 
rate on expected future cash flows, debt relief can remove the debt overhang, thereby restoring 
positive NRTs, investment, and growth (Krugman (1989) and Sachs (1989)). 
 
A.  Is There a Change in NRT, Investment, and Growth? 
Table V reveals a clear association between the Brady debt restructuring and changes in the 
sign of the NRT.  In every one of the years from [-18, -9], the median NRT to the Brady countries is 
positive.  At the onset of the Debt Crisis (roughly year –7), the NRT turns negative and remains so 
until the Brady Plan (year 0).  After the Brady Plan, the NRT turns positive and remains so for the 
rest of the sample.  The table also shows that the change in the sign of the NRT occurs uniformly 
across almost all Brady countries.18  
[Table V About Here] 
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Figure 4 shows that there was also an investment boom in the aftermath of the Brady Plan.  
In the 5 years prior to debt relief, the average growth rate of the capital stock in the Brady countries 
was 1.6% per year.  In the 5 years following debt relief, the capital stock grew at a rate of 3.5% per 
year.   
[Figure 4 About Here] 
Figure 5 demonstrates that growth rates of GDP per capita also increased.  The Brady 
countries experience abnormally high growth rates in each of the 5 years following the Brady plan.  
There is no significant change in the average growth rate of the control group. 
[Figure 5 About Here] 
 
B.  Does the Stock Market Rationally Forecast the Changes? 
We also examine whether the stock market predicts the change in NRT and growth.  Table 
VI demonstrates a strong correlation between the sign of the cumulative abnormal return on a 
country’s stock market and the change in the sign of the NRT.  In 9 of 10 countries, the sign of the 
cumulative abnormal return matches the change in the sign of the NRT.   
[Table VI About Here] 
Table VI also shows a strong correlation between the sign of a country’s cumulative 
abnormal return on a country’s stock market and the sign of its growth deviation.  In 9 of 10 
countries, the sign of the cumulative abnormal return matches the sign of abnormal GDP growth in 
the year following the Brady Plan.  In 9 of 10 countries, the sign of the cumulative abnormal return 
matches the sign of the cumulative abnormal GDP growth for the period [0, +2] and similarly in 8 of 
the 10 countries for the period [0, +5].   
C. What Happens in the Long Run? 
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Ongoing commitment to economic reforms is essential for the long-run effectiveness of debt 
restructuring agreements.  Figure 6 illustrates the point.  In the three countries in which reforms 
temporarily stalled—Jordan, Nigeria, and the Philippines—the initial rise in stock market valuations 
disappears within a year.    
[Figure 6 About Here] 
More generally, it is interesting to ask how stock markets in the Brady countries perform 
relative to the control group in the years subsequent to the Brady Plan.  The average 3-year and 5-
year return on the stock market in the Brady countries exceeds that of the control group.  Statistical 
inference about stock returns over long horizons in volatile markets is a thorny task.  Accordingly, 
we make no attempt to do so.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the overall pattern of longer-run 
stock market performance of the Brady countries relative to their control group counterpart is not 
inconsistent with the investment and growth profiles (Figures 4 and 5). 
 
VII.  Do the Results Reflect a Wealth Transfer to the Countries from the Banks? 
The results suggest that debt relief generates large wealth gains for the debtor countries, but it 
is important to ask whether these gains came at the expense of the western commercial banks and 
their shareholders.  Figure 2 suggests that debt relief is not a zero sum game, but we now examine 
the result more thoroughly.  Since Figure 2 is based on numbers from 11 commercial banks, we 
begin by checking whether a large stock price increase for one or two banks drives the result.19  All 
11 commercial banks experienced stock price increases that were larger than their median 12-month 
stock price increase.  The probability of this occurring randomly is 0.0005%.   
We also check the result by running a series of panel regressions.  The specifications are 
identical to those used in Tables III and IV, with two important differences.  First, instead of debtor 
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country stock returns on the left-hand side, we now have a panel of monthly stock returns of 20 U.S. 
commercial banks: 11 that have significant LDC loan exposure and 9 that do not.  Second, the two 
dummy variables are now EXPOSED and NONEXPOSED.  For each of the 11 U.S. commercial 
banks with heavy LDC loan exposure, the variable EXPOSED takes on the value 1 during the 12-
month window preceding the official Brady announcement in March 1989 and is 0 otherwise.  The 
variable NONEXPOSED is analogously defined for the 9 banks without LDC loan exposure. 
All regressions were estimated using robust standard errors.  The results confirm the picture.  
The coefficient on EXPOSED—the monthly abnormal return associated with the Brady Plan—
ranges from 0.025 to 0.027 in alternative specifications and is significant at the 1% confidence level.  
Multiplying the coefficient estimate of 0.025 by 12 gives a total abnormal return of 30%, which is 
consistent with the magnitude in Figure 2.  The coefficient on NONEXPOSED is statistically and 
economically insignificant in almost every specification. 
Having confirmed the statistical significance of Figure 2, it is useful to consider the net 
wealth effect of the Brady Plan—the sum of the benefits to shareholders less any costs of 
implementing the plan.   
On the benefit side, the total market capitalization of debtor country stock markets rose by a 
total of 42 billion dollars.  Importantly, 42 billion represents only the wealth effect on the publicly 
traded corporate sector, which constitutes a relatively small fraction of economic activity in these 
countries.  Since debt relief seems to have positive effects on the rest of the economy (See Section 
VI), 42 billion dollars probably underestimates the total benefit to the debtor countries.  Similarly, 
because we do not have data on the Japanese, German, and British banks that had significant LDC 
exposure, the 13.3 billion dollar increase in the market capitalization of U.S. banks probably 
understates the total wealth gains to developed country shareholders.  Hence, a conservative estimate 
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suggests that the Brady Plan generated a 55.3 billion dollar wealth increase of which 42 billion 
accrued to shareholders in the debtor countries and 13.3 billion went to the creditors.   
On the cost side, banks received 25 billion dollars of enhancements in the form of U.S. 
Treasury bonds—collateral for principal and a rolling fund to cover several interest payments (Cline 
(1995), Chapter 5).  The debtor countries paid for the Treasury securities with loans from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  Since the Bank and the IMF needed a 
member-country-financed capital injection to make these loans, it could be argued that the 25 billion 
dollar figure represented a real cost to member-country taxpayers.  On the other hand, Cline argues 
that the Bank and the Fund "…lent at rates that reflect at least opportunity cost of Treasury bonds . . . 
so that the public sector is not providing concessional financing.  . . . the public-sector enhancements 
did not cost anything" (Cline, p. 265).  Whatever estimate one chooses to accept—25 billion dollars 
or zero—the cost of the Brady Deal was less than the wealth effect. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
Understanding why the Brady Plan produced rising asset prices, increased investment, and 
faster growth is pivotal to understanding the circumstances under which debt relief can be expected 
to yield efficiency gains.  The Brady Plan worked because debt relief was the appropriate policy 
response for a group of middle-income developing countries where debt overhang genuinely stood in 
the way of profitable new lending and investment.  Hence, the key questions for the current debate 
over collective action clauses and sovereign debt restructuring would seem to be the following: (1) 
how do you determine if a country suffers from debt overhang? and (2) will allowing a debtor 
country to unilaterally invoke a restructuring procedure yield the same kinds of benefits that were 
achieved under the multilateral framework of the Brady Plan? 
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While the evidence suggests that there can be large net gains to writing down the debt of 
middle-income developing countries, it is not clear that the results can be used to forecast the 
potential impact of debt relief on the world’s highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs).  For instance, 
debt relief may not yield efficiency gains for the HIPCs, because it is not obvious that they suffer 
from debt overhang.  Instead, the more conspicuous obstacle to investment and growth in the 
world’s poorest countries seems to be weak economic institutions and infrastructure (Arslanalp and 
Henry (2004)). 
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1 For an examination of the costs and benefits of official lending to sovereign states see Arslanalp and Henry (2004). 
 
2 Because it is the result of an agreement between borrower and lender, debt relief does not constitute an outright default.  
Nonetheless, debt relief violates the terms of the original loan contract and therefore constitutes a restructuring default 
(Vir Bhatia (2002)). 
3 For an alternative view see Shleifer (2003). 
 
4 For an early analysis of developing country loan spreads, see Edwards (1984). 
5 For Ecuador, the source of stock market data is the Global Financial Data Base. 
6 Alternative measures of abnormal returns are considered in Section III. 
7For a given Brady country, the control group abnormal returns are calculated as follows.  Fix the announcement date [0] 
for the country in question.  Next, for each of the 16 countries in the control group, calculate the abnormal returns for [-
12, 0].  This calculation gives 16 sets of abnormal returns for the fixed Brady-country date.  Next, calculate the average 
of these 16 sets of abnormal returns and you have the single series of abnormal returns for the control group associated 
with the first country.  Now repeat the procedure for the other 9 Brady countries.  Doing so yields 10 series of average 
abnormal returns for the months [-12, 0].  Finally, taking the average across all 10 series gives the average abnormal 
return for the entire control group.   
8These graphs are not shown but are available on request. 
9There were 17 countries included in the Baker Plan: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’ 
Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.  The 16 
countries included in the Brady Plan are listed in Table 1. 
10 For example, see the reactions of democratic senators Bill Bradley (1989), Paul Sarbanes (1989), Former Mexican 
Finance Minister, Jesús Silva Herzog (1989), and Stanley Fischer (1989). 
11 For conceptual discussions of the ICAPM, see Frankel (1994) and Stulz (1999).  For empirical evidence on the real 
effects of increased capital market integration, see Henry (2000b, 2003) and the references therein. 
12 The countries represented in Figure 3 match the countries represented in Figure 1 almost perfectly.  Jordan is the only 
country represented in Figure 1 that is not represented in Figure 3.  This is because Jordan was not a Baker country. 
13 For example, see the remarks by Stanley Fischer (Fischer (1989, 1990)). 
14 See also Fischer’s comments on Williamson’s paper (Fischer (1990)). 
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15 This is a complicated issue.  The Baker Plan called for reforms, support from the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), and new money from the commercial banks.  The Baker Plan assumed that the banks would be willing to lend 
new money as long as countries implemented reforms.  This assumption turned out to be wrong.  In spite of substantial 
reforms on the part of the debtors and IFI support, the banks were unwilling to extend new loans.  There is a widely held 
view that the banks were unwilling to do so because of the existing debt overhang (Cline (1995)). 
16 See the remarks by Herzog (1989) and Sarbanes (1989).  
17 The insignificance of the IMFPROGRAM variable is consistent with evidence that the market responds positively to 
IMF agreements only when they are announced in the midst of high inflation (Henry (2002)). 
18 In Poland, the NRT turned positive in 1991—before its debt relief plan was unveiled.  However, following Poland’s 
plan, there was a three-fold increase in the level of NRT.   
19 The 11 highly exposed commercial banks are Bank of America, Bank of New York, Bankers Trust, Chase, Chemical, 
Citibank, Continental, First Chicago, First Pennsylvania, JP Morgan, and Manufacturers Hanover (see Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1993)). 
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Figure 1.  Debtor country stock prices rise in anticipation of debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the 
continuously compounded abnormal percentage change.  0 is the month in which the debt relief plan was 
announced.  The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 
10 Brady countries with stock market data available on a constant and 9 country-specific dummies.  The dashed line 
is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 16 control group countries 
on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. 
Figure 2.  Stock prices of banks with LDC loan exposure rise in anticipation of debt relief.  The variable on the 
y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change.  0 is the month (March 1989) in which the 
Brady plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real 
dollar return from 11 banks with high LDC loan exposure on a constant and 10 bank-specific dummies.  The dashed 
line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 9 control group banks 
with no LDC loan exposure on a constant and 8 bank-specific dummies. 
Figure 3.  Debtor country stock prices rise in anticipation of reforms under the Baker Plan.  The variable on 
the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change.  0 is the month in which the Baker Plan 
was announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real 
local currency return on a constant and 10 country-specific dummies (for the 11 Baker countries that later became 
Brady countries). 
Figure 4.  Investment in debtor countries surges following the Brady Plan.  The variable on the y-axis is the 
percentage change in capital stock.  0 is the year in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The series in bold 
color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the capital stock growth rate from all 16 Brady countries on 
a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.  The series in light color is a plot of the residuals from a panel 
regression of the capital stock growth rate from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific 
dummies. 
Figure 5.  GDP growth in the debtor countries increases following debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the 
abnormal percentage deviation from the trend growth rate.  0 is the year in which the debt relief plan was 
announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP growth rate 
from all 16 Brady countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.  The series in light color is a plot of the 
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residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP growth rate from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 
country-specific dummies. 
Figure 6.  The stock market gains evaporate in countries that do not stick to reforms.  The variable on the y-
axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change.  0 is the month in which the debt relief plan was 
announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar 
return from 7 reformer Brady countries with stock market data available (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Poland, and Venezuela) on a constant and 6 country-specific dummies.  The series in light color is a plot of the 
cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 3 non-reformer Brady countries with 
stock market data available (Jordan, Nigeria, and Philippines) on a constant and 2 country-specific dummies. 
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Figure 1.  Debtor country stock prices rise in anticipation of debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage 
change.  0 is the month in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar 
return from 10 Brady countries with stock market data available on a constant and 9 country-specific dummies.  The dashed line is a plot of the cumulative 
residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. 
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Figure 2.  Stock prices of banks with LDC loan exposure rise in anticipation of debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded 
abnormal percentage change.  0 is the month (March 1989) in which the Brady plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a 
panel regression of the real dollar return from 11 banks with high LDC loan exposure on a constant and 10 bank-specific dummies.  The dashed line is a plot of 
the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 9 control group banks with no LDC loan exposure on a constant and 8 bank-
specific dummies. 
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Figure 3.  Debtor country stock prices rise in anticipation of reforms under the Baker Plan.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded 
abnormal percentage change.  0 is the month in which the Baker Plan was announced.  The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel 
regression of the real local currency return on a constant and 10 country-specific dummies (for the 11 Baker countries that later became Brady countries). 
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Figure 4.  Investment in debtor countries surges following the Brady Plan.  The variable on the y-axis is the percentage change in the real capital stock.  0 is 
the year in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the capital stock growth rate from all 16 
Brady countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.  The dashed line is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the capital stock growth rate 
from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. 
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Figure 5.  GDP growth in the debtor countries increases following debt relief.  The variable on the y-axis is the abnormal percentage deviation from the trend 
growth rate.  0 is the year in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP growth 
rate from all 16 Brady countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.  The dashed line is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real 
GDP growth rate from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. 
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Figure 6.  The stock market gains evaporate in countries that do not stick to reforms.  The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal 
percentage change.  0 is the month in which the debt relief plan was announced.  The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the 
real dollar return from 7 reformer Brady countries with stock market data available (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and Venezuela) on a 
constant and 6 country-specific dummies.  The dashed line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 3 non-
reformer Brady countries with stock market data available (Jordan, Nigeria, and Philippines) on a constant and 2 country-specific dummies.
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Table I 
A Typical Country Restructures its External Debt Several Times between the 1982 Mexican Default and its Own Brady Deal. 
The first column lists all the countries that signed Brady deals.  The second column lists the number of debt restructurings that took place in the country after Mexico’s default in August 
1982 and before the country’s Brady agreement was announced.  The sources for the information on country restructuring dates are World Bank (1997) and Global Development Finance.  
The last column lists the date on which each country’s Brady Deal was announced. 
 
Number of Restructurings 
From 1982 to Brady 
First Restructuring Date  
After 1982 
Last Restructuring Date 
Before the Brady Deal 
Brady Deal Announcement 
Date 
Argentina 2 August 1985 August 1987 April 1992 
     
Bolivia 1 July 1988 July 1988 March 1993 
     
Brazil 4 February 1983 November 1988 August 1992 
     
Bulgaria 0 N.A. N.A. November 1993 
     
Costa Rica 2 September 1983 May 1985 November 1989 
     
Dominican Republic 2 December 1983 February 1986 May 1993 
     
Ecuador 3 October 1983 November 1987 May 1994 
     
Jordan 1 September 1989 September 1989 June 1993 
     
Mexico 5 August 1983 August 1987 September 1989 
     
Nigeria 2 November 1987 March 1989 March 1991 
     
Panama 1 October 1985 October 1985 May 1995 
     
Peru 1 July 1983 July 1983 October 1995 
     
Philippines 2 January 1986 December 1987 August 1989 
     
Poland 6 April 1982 July 1988 March 1994 
     
Uruguay 3 July 1983 March 1988 November 1990 
     
Venezuela 2 February 1986 September 1988 June 1990 
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Table II 
Brady Deals Are Preceded by a Number of Economic Reforms. 
This table lists the announcement dates of major economic events for the Brady countries. The first column identifies these countries.  The second column lists the 
month and year of each country’s Brady Plan.  These dates are obtained from Cline (1995), Lexis Nexis, and various issues of the Economist Intelligence Unit.  The 
third column lists IMF plans that are announced shortly preceding or following Brady Plans. These dates are obtained from Henry (2002) and various issues of the IMF 
Annual Reports.  A Standby agreement with the IMF is noted as SB and an Extended Fund Facility agreement is noted as EFF.  The next three columns list the dates of 
the beginnings of major economic reforms.  The trade liberalization dates are obtained from Sachs and Warner (1995).  The privatization dates are obtained from the 
Privatization Data Base maintained by the World Bank.  The capital account liberalization dates are obtained from Henry (2003).  *Poland switched to a market 
economy in 1990, simultaneously setting up a stock market and opening up to foreign investment.  **Venezuela reversed its trade liberalization reforms in 1993. 
 
Country 
 
Brady Plan 
Stabilization (IMF 
Program) 
 
Trade Liberalization 
 
Privatization 
Capital Account 
Liberalization 
Argentina April 1992 March 1992 (EFF) April 1991 
 
February 1988 
 
November 1989 
 
Bolivia 
 
March 1993  1985 1992 NA 
Brazil August 1992 January 1992 (SB) April 1990 July 1990 March 1988 
 
Bulgaria 
 
November 1993 NA NA 1991 NA 
 
Costa Rica November 1989 NA 1986 1988 NA 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
May 1993 NA Closed 1999 NA 
Ecuador May 1994 May 1994 January 1991 February 1993 January 1993 
 
Jordan June 1993 May 1994 (EFF) 1965 January 1995 January 1978 
 
Mexico September 1989 May 1989 (EFF) July 1986 November 1988 May 1989 
 
Nigeria March 1991 January 1991 (SB) Closed July 1988 Closed 
 
Panama May 1995  NA 1990 NA 
 
Peru October 1995 March 1993 (EFF) March 1991 March 1991 (Open Before 1995)  
 
Philippines August 1989 May 1989 (EFF)  November 1988 June 1988 May 1986 
 
Poland March 1994 August 1994 (SB) 1990 1990* 1990 
 
Uruguay November 1990  1990 1990 NA 
 
Venezuela June 1990 June 1989 (EFF) May 1989** April 1991 January 1990 
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Table III 
Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief Announcements.  The Control Countries Do Not.   
Panel A: White-Corrected OLS Estimates. 
The estimation procedure used is ordinary least squares.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the Brady and Control 
groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, The Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, and Pakistan; before December 1986 for 
Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, and Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and 
before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  BRADY is a dummy variable that takes on the value one 
for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group 
during the months preceding Brady Plans.  The column labeled 12-month Window presents estimates of BRADY and CONTROL using an event window that begins 12 months 
prior to the announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled 9-month Window, 6-Month 
Window and 3-Month Window.  For each event window, six regression specifications are estimated.  The first row presents estimates of BRADY and CONTROL using the 
benchmark specification that allows for country-specific intercept terms.  Row 2 presents estimates using an alternative specification that allows for only a single intercept 
term.  Row 3 presents estimates using the ICAPM specification that introduces the World stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  Row 4 presents estimates 
using the US stock return index instead of the World stock index.  Row 5 presents estimates using the LDC stock return index instead.  Finally, row 6 presents estimates that 
use all three sets of indices simultaneously.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on BRADY is statistically larger than the 
coefficient on CONTROL.  White-corrected standard errors are given in parentheses.   
 12-Month Window 9-Month Window 6-Month Window 3-Month Window 
  
(1a) 
 
(1b) 
 
(1c) 
 
(2a) 
 
(2b) 
 
(2c) 
 
(3a) 
 
(3b) 
 
(3c) 
 
(4a) 
 
(4b) 
 
(4c) 
Right-
hand-side 
variables 
 
 
Brady 
 
 
 
Control 
 
Brady> 
Control? 
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control
 
Brady> 
Control?
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control 
 
Brady> 
Control?
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control
 
Brady> 
Control? 
             
Country-
specific 
mean 
 .050*** 
(.014) 
.004 
(.004) 
0.001  .050*** 
 (.015) 
 .010** 
(.005) 
0.011  .048*** 
(.016) 
    .014*** 
   (.005) 
0.041    .048* 
(.026) 
.009 
(.007) 
0.15 
 
 
             
Constant 
mean 
 .049*** 
(.013) 
.005 
(.004) 
0.001  .051*** 
 (.015) 
 .009** 
(.004) 
0.005  .049*** 
(.016) 
 .013*** 
(.0045858)
0.022    .045* 
(.025) 
.006 
(.007) 
0.13 
 
 
World  .047*** 
(.014) 
.002 
(.005) 
0.002  .047*** 
 (.016) 
 .009* 
(.005) 
0.023  .045*** 
(.016) 
    .014*** 
   (.005) 
0.080    .049* 
(.025) 
.004 
(.007) 
0.09 
 
 
U.S.  .046*** 
(.013) 
-.000 
(.005) 
0.001  .046*** 
 (.016) 
.007 
(.005) 
0.018  .043*** 
(.016) 
    .014*** 
   (.005) 
0.076   .048* 
(026) 
.004 
(.007) 
0.10 
 
 
LDC  .046*** 
(.014) 
-.008 
(.006) 
0.000  .043*** 
 (.016) 
.001 
(.005) 
0.011 .039** 
 (.016) 
.005 
(.005) 
0.0480  .052** 
(.024) 
.010 
(.007) 
0.10 
 
 
ALL  .047*** 
(.014) 
-.007 
(.006) 
0.000  .044*** 
 (.016) 
.002 
(.005) 
0.011   .039** 
 (.016) 
.005 
(.005) 
0.0451  .052** 
(.025) 
.009 
(.007) 
0.09 
 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table III 
Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief Announcements.  The Control Countries Do Not. 
Panel B: FGLS Estimates. 
The estimation procedure is feasible generalized least squares.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the BRADY and 
CONTROL groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, and Pakistan; before December 1986 
for Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and 
before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  BRADY is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for 
each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group during the 
months preceding Brady Plans.  The column labeled 12-month Window presents estimates of Brady and Control using an event window that begins 12 months prior to the 
announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled 9-month Window, 6-Month Window and 3-
Month Window.  For each event window, six regression specifications are estimated.  The first row presents estimates of BRADY and CONTROL using the benchmark 
specification that allows for country-specific intercept terms.  Row 2 presents estimates using an alternative specification that allows for only a single intercept term.  Row 3 
presents estimates using the ICAPM specification that introduces the world stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  Row 4 presents estimates using the U.S. stock 
return index instead of the world stock index.  Row 5 presents estimates using the LDC stock return index instead.  Finally, row 6 presents estimates that use all three sets of 
indices simultaneously.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on BRADY is statistically larger than the coefficient on CONTROL.  
Standard errors are given in parenthesis.     
  
12-Month Window 
 
9-Month Window 
 
6-Month Window 
 
3-Month Window 
 
 
 
(1a) 
 
(1b) 
 
(1c) 
 
(2a) 
 
(2b) 
 
(2c) 
 
(3a) 
 
(3b) 
 
(3c) 
 
(4a) 
 
(4b) 
 
(4c) 
Right-
hand-
side 
variables 
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control 
 
Brady> 
Control? 
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control 
 
Brady> 
Control? 
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control 
 
Brady> 
Control? 
 
 
Brady 
 
 
Control 
 
Brady> 
Control? 
 
             
Country-
specific 
mean 
  .041*** 
 (.010) 
.007 
(.004) 
0.003  .046*** 
(.011) 
 .012** 
(.005) 
0.005  .051*** 
(.013) 
 .015*** 
(.005) 
0.01     .040* 
(.019) 
   .014** 
(.006) 
0.20 
             
Constant 
mean 
 
  .038*** 
 (.010) 
   .008* 
(.004) 
0.003  .044*** 
(.011) 
 .011*** 
(.004) 
0.005  .049*** 
(.013) 
 .015*** 
(.006) 
0.01    .039** 
(.019) 
   .014** 
(.006) 
0.21 
World 
 
 
  .033*** 
 (.011) 
.003 
(.005) 
0.015  .039*** 
(.013) 
    .009* 
(.005) 
0.026  .045*** 
(.015) 
 .013*** 
(.005) 
0.04    .042** 
(.022) 
   .012** 
(.006) 
0.17 
US 
 
 
  .032*** 
 (.011) 
.002 
(.005) 
0.013  .038*** 
(.013) 
.008 
(.005) 
0.023  .045*** 
(.015) 
 .013*** 
(.005) 
0.03    .042** 
(.022) 
    .010* 
(.006) 
0.14 
LDC 
 
 
  .034*** 
 (.012) 
  -.005 
(.005) 
0.002  .037*** 
(.013) 
.001 
(.005) 
0.010  .043*** 
(.015) 
.005 
(.005) 
0.01    .043** 
(.021) 
.007 
(.006) 
0.11 
ALL   .034***   -.005 0.002  .036*** .001 0.011  .043*** .005 0.02    .042** .006 0.10 
 51
  (.012) (.005) (.013) (.005) (.015) (.005) (.022) (.006) 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table IV 
After Controlling for Other Reforms, Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief Announcements.  
The Control Countries Do Not.  Panel A: White-Corrected OLS Estimates. 
The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares; White-corrected standard errors are given in parentheses.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the 
countries in the BRADY and CONTROL groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, and Pakistan; before 
December 1986 for Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, and Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for 
Ecuador; and before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  BRADY is a dummy variable that takes on the value one 
for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  Four different event windows are utilized.  The column labeled 12-month Window presents estimates of BRADY 
and CONTROL using an event window that begins 12 months prior to the announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month.  The analogous definition applies to the 
columns labeled 9-month Window, 6-Month Window and 3-Month Window.  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for each country in the control group during the 
months preceding Brady Plans.  PRIVATIZE, TRADE, and LIBERALIZE are dummy variables that take on the value one during the event window preceding a privatization, trade 
liberalization and stock market liberalization, respectively.  For each event window, two regression specifications are estimated.  The World-Return Model column presents estimates of 
BRADY, CONTROL, PRIVATIZE, TRADE, and LIBERALIZE using the ICAPM specification that introduces the world stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  The 
Constant-Mean column presents estimates using the specification that allows for only a single intercept term.  The column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the 
coefficient on Brady is statistically larger than the coefficient on Control.   
  
World-Return Model 
  
Constant-Mean Return Model 
  
12-Month 
Window 
 
9-Month 
Window 
 
6-Month 
Window 
 
3-Month 
Window 
  
12-Month 
Window 
 
9-Month 
Window 
 
6-Month 
Window 
 
3-Month 
Window 
 
Brady 
 
      .048*** 
(.012) 
 
 
     .049*** 
(.013) 
 
     .047*** 
(.016) 
 
   .054** 
(.023) 
  
     .048*** 
(.012) 
 
      .048*** 
(.013) 
 
     .046*** 
(.015) 
 
    .053** 
(.022) 
Control .003 
(.005) 
.008 
(.005) 
.012** 
  (.006) 
.009 
(.008) 
 
 .005 
(.005) 
.009** 
    (.005) 
.013*** 
 (.005) 
.010 
(.007) 
Brady>Control? 
 
0.000 
 
0.003 
 
0.03 
 
0.07 
 
 0.000 
 
0.004 
 
0.040 
 
0.070 
 
 
Privatize .005 
(.014) 
.011 
(.016) 
.011 
(.018) 
 
.022 
(.028) 
 .005 
(.014) 
.010 
(.015) 
.012 
(.018) 
.023 
(.027) 
Trade         -.013 
(.016) 
      -.004 
(.018) 
    -.006 
(.022) 
      -.052 
(.033) 
         -.011 
(.016) 
      -.001 
(.018) 
    -.002 
(.021) 
       -.048 
(.032) 
 
Liberalize 
 
.009 
(.016) 
 
.025 
(.018) 
 
    .051** 
(.021) 
 
     .094*** 
(.033) 
  
.013 
(.016) 
 
.029 
(.018) 
 
     .057*** 
(.021) 
 
      .101*** 
(.032) 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table IV 
After Controlling for Other Reforms, Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief 
Announcements.  The Control Countries Do Not.  Panel B: FGLS Estimates. 
The estimation procedure used is feasible generalized least squares.  The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the BRADY 
and CONTROL groups.  Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, Philippines, Venezuela, Columbia, Malaysia, Pakistan; before December 1986 
for Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, and Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; 
and before December 1993 for the Czech Republic.  The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  BRADY is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
one for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady plan.  Four different event windows are utilized.  The column labeled 12-month Window presents 
estimates of BRADY and CONTROL using an event window that begins twelve months prior to the announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month.  
The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled 9-month Window, 6-Month Window and 3-Month Window.  CONTROL is a dummy variable that takes on the value 
one for each country in the control group during the months preceding Brady Plans.  PRIVATIZE, TRADE, and LIBERALIZE are dummy variables that take on the value one 
during the event window preceding a privatization, trade liberalization and stock market liberalization, respectively.  For each event window, two regression specifications are 
estimated.  The world column presents estimates of BRADY, CONTROL, PRIVATIZE, TRADE, and LIBERALIZE using the ICAPM specification that introduces the world 
stock return index as an additional explanatory variable.  The Constant Mean column presents estimates using the specification that allows for only a single intercept term.  The 
column labeled Brady>Control shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on BRADY is statistically larger than the coefficient on Control.   
  
World-Return Model 
  
Constant-Mean Return Model 
  
12-Month 
Window 
 
9-Month 
Window 
 
6-Month 
Window 
 
3-Month 
Window 
 
12-Month 
Window 
 
9-Month 
Window 
 
6-Month 
Window 
 
3-Month 
Window 
 
BRADY 
 
     .033*** 
(.011) 
 
     .039*** 
(.012) 
 
     .046*** 
(.014) 
 
   .045** 
(.021) 
  
     .037*** 
(.010) 
 
     .042*** 
(.011) 
 
     .048***
(.013) 
 
   .039** 
(.019) 
 
CONTROL         .004 
(.004) 
   .009** 
(.004) 
      .0127*** 
(.004) 
   .012** 
(.006) 
   .008* 
(.004) 
     .012*** 
(.004) 
     .015*** 
(.005) 
       .014** 
(.006) 
 
Brady>Control? 0.012 
 
 
0.014 
 
0.022 0.130 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.206 
PRIVATIZE         -.001 
(.012) 
      -.002 
(.014) 
.002 
(.016) 
.002 
(.024) 
        -.002 
(.012) 
     -.003 
(.013) 
.001 
(.016) 
.002 
(.023) 
 
TRADE         -.011 
(.020) 
      -.001 
(.022) 
      -.005 
(.026) 
     -.068* 
(.039) 
        -.005 
(.020) 
.006 
(.023) 
.002 
(.027) 
      -.061 
(.040) 
 
LIBERALIZE 
 
.0138 
(.020) 
.021 
(.022) 
.040 
(.026) 
      .078** 
(.039) 
 .021 
(.020) 
.029 
(.023) 
      .049* 
(.027) 
       .089** 
(.040) 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10& levels, respectively. 
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Table V 
The Brady Plan Reverses the Sign of the Net Resource Transfer (Millions of US$). 
Net resource transfers are equal to net resource flows minus interest payments on long-term loans and foreign direct investment profits.  The first column lists the 
years in event time.  The number 0 represents the year in which each country’s Brady Plan was announced.  For CONTROL group countries, 0 represents 1989.  The 
next two columns show the progression of net resource transfers in event time to the CONTROL group and the BRADY group.  The next five columns show the 
progression of the net resource transfers to individual Brady stock market countries in event time.  The data on net resource transfers are obtained from World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance Data Base. 
Year  CONTROL  
Median 
BRADY 
Median 
 
Arg 
 
Brazil 
 
Ecuador 
 
Jordan 
 
Mexico 
 
Nigeria 
 
Peru 
 
Phil 
 
Poland 
 
Ven 
-18 91 10 -86 5586 10 466 100 -725 211 -42 NA -535 
          
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
-17 143 123 -568 3968 484 471 132 -519 -328 123 NA -1036 
        
-16 116 382 613 4618 382 490 1188 -468 -406 -20 NA -1760 
        
-15 104 285 -358 4572 285 547 1747 -640 -580 295 NA -527 
        
-14 124 495 495 6869 349 1342 2418 -411 -479 510 NA -428 
        
-13 220 1371 3372 1858 704 1348 3112 1303 712 986 2346 1393 
        
-12 100 1063 1593 -844 -905 1272 3285 830 854 807 1500 1442 
        
-11 347 847 4436 1867 -432 1055 2433 -1354 440 639 213 2700 
        
-10 505 297 3231 -410 -207 997 1136 758 -84 547 -546 47 
        
-9 648 -43 -1197 -3614 -399 777 3043 1445 167 489 -324 -253 
        
-8 594 146 -3454 -1074 28 687 7490 700 263 729 -317 -1475 
        
-7 403 -419 -1330 -6550 85 867 542 -1426 153 561 -1437 -923 
        
-6 330 -1679 -2971 -7100 -63 745 -5658 -2290 203 865 -1067 -2550 
        
-5 529 -833 -2629 -7066 18 496 -8666 -514 243 72 -1152 -2486 
        
-4 189 -229 -1729 -7229 -251 808 -9452 95 -206 224 -202 -3856 
        
-3 84 -767 -1412 -8948 -354 853 -6443 -1180 228 -263 2753 -4276 
        
-2 -71 -578 -2571 -3952 -377 410 -1485 1414 2155 -779 1163 -3483 
        
-1 -10 -283 528 -496 231 -70 -7443 -1799 4460 -655 2180 -1927 
        
0 187 -54 2917 5026 67 -222 -7553 -1473 3723 -175 2176 -2283 
        
1 366 2372 11975 10913 144 39 5364 -2277 3946 51 6437 797 
        
2 998 1216 7794 3469 278 333 4798 351 2080 -272 4804 206 
        
3 1173 1125 6122 7217 555 70 1699 631 1618 -844 6169 -1280 
4 2 675 2267 13205 18474 -169 610 13114 -372 2160 2374 7943 -1836 
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5 2197 1422 12793 24250 156 208 11235 -691 550 2293 8317 -1811 
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Table VI. 
The Stock Market Forecasts Future Changes in the Net Resource Transfer and GDP Growth. 
This table presents the correlation between increases in market valuation before Brady Plan announcements and changes in net resource transfers 
and GDP growth afterwards.  The first column lists the Brady Stock market countries. The Brady Stock market countries are the countries in the 
Brady group with available stock market data as displayed in Table I.  The second column identifies the countries that experienced abnormal stock 
market returns over the 12 months preceding their Brady Plan announcements.  The third column identifies the countries that experienced changes 
from negative NRT to positive NRT in the year preceding or during the two years following the announcement.  The fourth column identifies the 
countries that experienced abnormal GDP growth in the year of the announcement.  The fifth and sixth columns identify those that experienced 
abnormal growth in the first and second year after the announcement.  Finally, the seventh and eight columns identify the countries that 
experienced abnormal cumulative GDP growth during the two and five years following the announcement of the Brady Plan.  The + sign denotes 
positive identification of a country.  * Following the Brady Plan in Poland there is no change in the sign of NRT, but the level of NRT almost 
triples.   
 Stock Market 
Deviation 
Anticipating 
Debt Relief 
Change in 
the Net 
Resource 
Transfer 
 
Growth 
Deviation: 
Year [0] 
 
Growth 
Deviation: 
Year [+1] 
 
Growth 
Deviation: 
Year [+2] 
Cumulative 
Growth 
Deviation 
Year [0, +2]
Cumulative 
Growth 
Deviation: 
Year [0, +5]
Argentina + + + + + + + 
 
Brazil + + - + + + + 
 
Ecuador + + + + + + - 
 
Jordan + + - + + + + 
 
Mexico + + + + + + + 
 
Nigeria + + + + + + + 
 
Peru - No change 
in sign 
 
+ + + + + 
Philippines + + + + - + + 
 
Poland + No change 
in sign* 
 
+ + + + + 
Venezuela + + + + + + + 
 
 
